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1 Author names appear in alphabetical order. 
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Introduction 
Are powerful Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) more likely to be 
reelected than their “regular” colleagues? At first glance, this question appears 
straightforward and the answer a rather obvious “yes.” Upon further consideration, 
however, neither is the case. To start, it is neither clear nor easy to determine, who is 
influential and who is not in legislative politics, because power and influence are 
multifaceted and diffuse concepts. They may derive from formal leadership positions, for 
example, but also from personal traits such as skills, experience, expertise, ambition, 
determination, or a lack of scruples, which are exceedingly difficult to measure. 
Moreover, influence may not only be diffuse, but also limited to particular policy areas, 
which means that determining who is powerful in general (across a broad range of issues 
and legislation) likely masks important nuances in “who matters” in legislative decision-
making. Finally, the elusive nature of power and influence makes it difficult to answer 
the question whether or not powerful lawmakers are more likely to secure reelection.  
In this paper, we undertake two challenges: measuring political influence and 
using influence to explain reelection. First, we develop a new measure of policy 
leadership in the European Parliament (EP), by which we mean leadership by lawmakers 
in particular policy domains. Second, we investigate the predictive power of this new 
indicator by considering its ability to explain individual MEPs’ reelection. In other 
words, we ask if policy leaders are more likely to be reelected, controlling for relevant 
confounding factors, such as formal party and legislative leadership, seniority, and the 
electoral performance of MEPs’ national parties. 
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Our policy leadership variable builds on a recently developed measure of 
influence in legislative politics, namely political actors’ centrality in co-voting networks 
(Ringe and Wilson 2014). This measure uses legislators’ voting patterns to capture their 
social connectedness and determine the relative influence of individual lawmakers by 
examining their relative positions in the network structure of the legislature (Bailey and 
Sinclair 2008). The basis for this conceptualization of voting as a relational activity is a 
simple cueing dynamic in which some lawmakers follow the lead of their colleagues 
when voting in a legislature. Those legislators who most influence the greatest number of 
colleagues’ voting decisions are most central, and thus most influential, in the legislative 
co-voting network.  
We calculate co-voting centrality for 21 policy areas (defined by the jurisdictions 
of the EP’s standing committees) using the complete set of roll-call votes from the 2009-
14 EP term. For each policy area, we identify the most influential MEPs and aggregate 
the measure across all policy domains, which we then use to predict the likelihood that 
incumbent MEPs secure reelection in the 2014 EP election. Our results confirm, most 
notably, that policy leadership is positively associated with the likelihood of reelection. 
They also show that MEPs who serve as rapporteurs, party leaders, and intergroup chairs 
are more likely to be reelected for another term. 
An important innovation and contribution of this paper is the use of social 
network analysis to gain insights into legislators’ voting behavior and the use of voting 
data to identify influential lawmakers. Often, legislative voting is treated as an individual-
level activity, and key to many analyses of voting behavior is the assumption that voting 
decisions are independent of each other. However, in this paper we conceptualize voting, 
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and voting data, in broader terms, by considering how we can garner information about 
individual-level influence by investigating the co-voting network structure as a whole. 
Treating co-voting data as a relational measure and using them to identify influential 
legislators constitutes a novel approach to the study of legislative influence. Moreover, 
we extend and fine-tune the concept of co-voting centrality to capture influence in 
particular policy domains, which allows for a more nuanced identification of which 
MEPs “matter.” After all, considering only who matters across all policy areas and votes 
likely masks the role of policy specialists who are highly influential in particular issue 
areas. 
Importantly, we allow the voting data to help us identify influential MEPs, rather 
than build on assumptions about who should matter because of formal leadership 
positions, seniority, or visibility. This allows our measure to travel easily to other 
legislative arenas, as long as a sufficient number of roll-call votes are available for 
analysis. 
Finally, we contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of EP elections. 
While we have learned much from applications (and recent extensions) of the second-
order election model to EP elections and from considerations of voter motivations, most 
analyses are focused on either individual-level vote choice or the aggregate performance 
of national or EU-level parties in EP elections. We ask specifically what helps explain 
that incumbent MEPs make it back to the EP for another term. 
The paper proceeds as follows: we begin by discussing the difficulty of measuring 
“influence” in legislative politics in general, and in the EP in particular, and discuss in 
some detail Ringe and Wilson’s co-voting centrality measure (2014), on which our policy 
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leadership variable builds. We then describe the operationalization of our measure. After 
briefly discussing what we already know about EP elections, we move on to the empirical 
analysis explaining reelection to the EP, which demonstrates the predictive power of 
policy leadership. The final section concludes. 
 
Measuring Legislative Influence 
Who is influential in EP politics? This is the first main question our research 
seeks to address, but also one that is exceedingly difficult to answer, for two reasons. 
First, the EP’s institutional setup and practical operation does not unambiguously 
empower a particular set of political actors over others. On the one hand, the EP is a 
party-centered legislature, and there is abundant evidence for the (growing) importance of 
party politics (see, in particular, Hix, Roland, and Noury 2007). On the other hand, the 
EP’s legislative backbone are its standing committee (Westlake 1994), which are 
(largely) populated by expert MEPs and committed individual members. We therefore 
cannot say, a priori, that the influence of parties necessarily trumps that of committees, 
for example, and (by extension) that party leaders dominate decision-making processes 
and outcomes (as they do in many lawmaking bodies). Indeed, there is no single 
leadership group that fully controls the activities and vote choices of individual MEPs 
(Kreppel 2006, 260) because policy-making in the EP is a rather decentralized process 
that eschews strict hierarchies (Ringe 2010). What often matters is participation in 
substantive deliberations and negotiations of legislative proposals, as the majority of 
substantive changes in the content of legislation and cross-party compromises are made 
in committee (Kreppel 2006) following deliberations and negotiations among small 
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groups of key actors (Ringe 2010). Individual MEPs can, therefore, have a great deal of 
influence on decision-making processes and outcomes by choosing to actively participate 
in the policy process (Ringe 2010, 59; also Marshall 2010, 559). 
This brings us to the second reason why it is difficult to identify who “matters” in 
EP politics (as well as in numerous other legislative contexts): much of the influence 
individual lawmakers may yield is diffuse. While it is surely the case that MEPs who 
hold formal positions of power (such as party leaders, committee leaders, coordinators, or 
rapporteurs) are likely able to sway others in EP decision-making processes, influence is 
also reflective of certain personal attributes—and others’ perceptions thereof—that are 
difficult to gauge, such as being knowledgeable, cooperative, trustworthy, well 
connected, cunning, effective, or ruthless. These attributes are difficult to capture, and we 
do not attempt to do so in this paper. Instead, we capture the observable implication of 
legislators’ influence, namely that other lawmakers follow their lead when making 
individual-level choices that are aggregated into collective decisions. In particular, we are 
interested in capturing what we call “policy leadership,” that is, the extent to which MEPs 
guide others in making decisions in particular policy areas. 
Our indicator of policy leadership builds on a recently developed measure of 
legislative influence that draws from the study of power in social networks: political 
actors’ centrality in co-voting networks (Ringe and Wilson 2014). Voting is thus 
conceived of as a relational activity. It is not, in other words, an atomistic act performed 
by legislators independently of one another, but mutually interdependent: one legislator’s 
voting intention affects those of others, and vice versa. Specifically, voting is 
conceptualized a simple cueing dynamic, where one (set of) legislator(s) sends a signal to 
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(an)other (set of) legislator(s) indicating the appropriate vote choice. This signal can be 
“any communication – verbal or non-verbal – intended or unintended – that is employed 
by the cue-taker as a prescription for his vote” (Matthews and Stimson 1975, 51; see also 
Kingdon 1973, 1977; Stimson 1975; Sullivan et al. 1993; Masket 2008; Ringe 2010; 
Box-Steffensmeier, Ryan, and Sokhey 2015). Those legislators (cue-providers) who 
influence the greatest number of colleagues’ (cue-receivers) voting decisions are most 
central, and thus most influential, in the legislative co-voting network.  
There are a variety of reasons why an individual legislator may follow a 
colleague’s cue when casting a vote, such as coercion (Legislator A forces Legislator B 
to adopt the cue, for example by threatening sanction), expertise (A is a policy expert, B 
is not), a division of labor (B adopts A’s cues in one policy area and A adopts B’s cues in 
another), normative considerations (e.g., B feels a sense of loyalty toward A), or 
persuasion (A convinces B to adopt the cue). Ringe and Wilson’s model does not, 
however, make any restrictive assumptions about legislators’ motivations for adopting a 
cue. All it assumes, a priori, is that there is a temporal voting sequence in which the cue-
provider offers the cue at time t and the receiver casts a vote, either following the cue or 
not, at time t+1. The model’s principle proposition is that cue-providers are more central 
in the legislative co-voting network than cue-receivers; indeed, the more cue-receivers 
are influenced by the cue-provider, the greater the latter’s centrality in the co-voting 
network. It is in this sense that centrality implies influence.  
In social network terms, legislators constitute the nodes in a social network in 
which like-votes (i.e., the two members of a dyad of legislators both cast yes votes, both 
cast no votes, or both abstain) form the ties that connect them. Observing like-votes 
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between two lawmakers does not, however, allow us to determine who influences whom: 
we may observe that Legislators A and Legislator B cast like-votes, but cannot observe 
the direction of their connection. Co-voting data, in other words, are undirected (or 
symmetric). This is an important challenge because the data used to capture legislators’ 
social ties do not match the theoretical proposition of a cueing dynamic, where the cue-
receiver’s vote choice is dependent on the cue-provider’s signal. In other words, Ringe 
and Wilson’s theory of legislative influence implies a directionality that is, as such, 
unobservable in the data they use to measure it (roll-call votes from the 2004-2009 EP 
term).  
This is only a problem when examining co-voting at the dyadic level, however; 
observing broader network patterns provides additional analytic leverage. Simply put, we 
may not be able to differentiate between cue-provider and cue-receiver when we only 
look at any two legislators, but we are able to do so when we consider the voting patterns 
of larger groups, because an individual legislator will be more central in the co-voting 
network if a group of colleagues systematically adopts or opposes his or her positions 
across a number of votes. 
The notion of co-voting centrality as a measure of influence therefore presupposes 
that cue-providers be more central than their followers in co-voting networks. Only if this 
is true does it become possible to use co-voting centrality to identify those legislators 
who are most influential. Ringe and Wilson make this case, first, by presenting a formal 
mathematical proof demonstrating that cue-providers are always more central than cue-
followers. Second, they construct an agent-based model that simulates legislatures of 
various sizes and parameterizations, which demonstrates the proof’s robustness to the 
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noise and intricacies of various real-world scenarios. Finally, they present a construct 
validity test, which involves deriving expectations about the determinants of influence in 
the EP (the concept they proclaim to measure) and testing them by empirically 
identifying the predictors of co-voting centrality (the measure itself). Their findings lend 
credence to the conception of co-voting centrality as a measure of legislative influence, 
because the empirical results make substantive sense given what we know about 
institutional politics and the process of policy-making in the EP: influential MEPs tend to 
be those who serve as committee coordinators and rapporteurs, introduce amendments to 
a greater number of reports, have served a greater number of EP terms, and are 
ideologically centrist. 
 Co-voting centrality is an innovative way of measuring influence, as a concept 
that is exceedingly difficult to capture and operationalize. Importantly, it does not make 
assumptions about legislative influence by considering the formal positions of power 
legislators hold, their seniority, or their fund-raising prowess; instead, it lets the data tell 
us who wields power by influencing the votes of the greatest number of fellow 
legislators. Moreover, the approach travels easily across legislative arenas, for two 
reasons. First, the model is parsimonious and general, in that it does not rely on restrictive 
a priori assumptions about why legislators follow cues, or who serves as cue-provider or 
cue-receiver. Second, all that is needed to calculate co-voting centrality are a sufficient 
number of roll-call votes, which are readily available in many contexts.  
 These advantages are considerable because of the difficulty of measuring 
influence outside of particular empirical contexts. For example, in research on American 
legislative politics, individual legislators’ influence is usually conceptualized in terms of 
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legislative “effectiveness” or “productivity.” A common measure is the “hit-rate” of 
legislators, that is, the percentage of bills that members sponsor that pass in committee, 
on the floor, or make it into law (e.g., Matthews 1960; Arnold 1979; Frantzich 1979; 
Sinclair 1986; Schiller 1995; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Howell et al. 2000; Wawro 2000; 
Anderson, Box-Steffensmeier, and Sinclair-Chapman 2003; Jedel and Taylor 2003; Adler 
and Wilkerson 2005; Garand and Burke 2006; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007; Cox and Terry 
2008). The most sophisticated version of this approach is Volden and Wiseman’s 
"Legislative Effectiveness Score,“ based on members of Congress "proven ability" to 
advance their own agenda items through the legislative process and into law (Volden and 
Wiseman 2014).2 An alternative proxy for legislative influence has been derived from 
cosponsorship data, most importantly Fowler’s measure of “connectedness” (Fowler 
2006a, 2006b). While these measures are useful and fairly accessible indicators of 
legislative effectiveness, however, they are problematic for students of comparative 
legislative politics because they do not easily travel to many lawmaking bodies. After all, 
sponsorship and cosponsorship of legislation by individual lawmakers is not the norm in 
many chambers. 
An alternative approach to measuring legislative effectiveness is to rely on survey 
data. The problem with this approach, aside from common concerns about validity and 
reliability (see Hall 1992), is that survey data are often not readily available and generally 
costly to acquire. It is thus not surprising that there are only a few examples of survey-
based studies of legislative effectiveness, and that their findings are not easily generalized 
beyond the single U.S. state legislature or the small number of legislative bills they focus 
                                                            
2. Their measure is based on the number of each member's bills that (1) are introduced, (2) receive action in 
committee, (3) receive action on the floor, (4) pass the House, and (5) become law, for three types of bills 
(1) commemorative, (2) substantive, and (3) substantive and significant. 
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on. Weissert (1991a, 1991b) and Miquel and Snyder (2006), for example, rely on surveys 
of legislators, lobbyists, and journalists to assess the effectiveness of legislators in the 
North Carolina House of Representatives. Meyer (1980) uses data from the same 
legislature, based on a questionnaire administered through interviews. DeGregorio (1997) 
surveys interest-group advocates in an effort to identify U.S. congressional “leaders” on a 
small number of specific bills. Perhaps the most promising example of survey-based 
research is Hall’s survey of legislative staffers in the U.S. Congress (Hall 1992). 
 Calculating co-voting centrality, in contrast, is possible whenever roll-call vote 
data are available. The concept does not, however, capture what we seek to measure in 
this paper: leadership in particular policy domains. We thus build on and extend the 
original measure by determining co-voting centrality by policy area using the complete 
set of roll-call votes of the 2009-2014 EP term and by aggregating leadership in one 
domain across all.  
 
Measuring Policy Leadership 
There are many types of centrality that can be calculated from a given network. In 
our case, degree centrality is most appropriate, as it captures the basic intuition that 
influence reflects the capacity to influence the greatest number of colleagues’ voting 
decisions. Moreover, types of centrality that focus on distance between nodes are not 
useful in this application since every node of the network touches every other, but with 
varying degrees of intensity. Additionally, due to the non-directional nature of co-voting 
data, measures of centrality that account for directionality are not appropriate either. In 
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mathematical terms, we calculate the degree centrality of each legislator using the 




Where n is the total number of legislators and ρij is the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between the voting records of legislators i and j. The output of this equation is 
bounded between zero and one. A value of one represents a legislator perfectly correlated 
with every other, while zero represents a legislator voting randomly relative to others. 
We screen out votes for which there is greater than 95% cohesion using Hix et al's 
agreement index (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2007). The reason for eliminating these votes 
from the calculation is that perfectly cohesive votes increase all voters' centrality (not by 
equal amounts, but in an order-preserving sense). Because centrality has a maximum 
value of one, having extremely cohesive votes compresses the centrality measure together 
up around that maximum value, reducing the variance in the measure without providing 
any additional information.3  
The reason for taking the absolute value of the correlation is to account for the 
fact that influence upon fellow legislators can be both positive and negative (Ringe, 
Victor, and Gross 2013). The centrality of a particular legislator should be reflected by 
the tendency of others to both vote for or against, such that low centrality is not indicative 
of losing votes so much as being irrelevant to votes. The alternative to this approach - 
                                                            
3. It is a standard to drop votes above a certain cohesion threshold for that reason, though the actual 
threshold varies from 95% to 97%. We calculated all values using both thresholds (and no threshold at all) 




merely summing correlations - leads to the most influential leaders having minimal 
centrality, as the positive and negative correlations cancel each other out algebraically. 
Due to the relatively large number of parties of significantly different sizes in the 
European Parliament, we further normalize this centrality by the size of the party of each 
legislator. This is to compensate for the fact that with very different party sizes, centrality 
tends to correlate heavily with party size: all else being equal, members of large parties 
will end up with higher centrality than those of smaller parties simply because their 
voting records are similar to everyone else in their party. We normalize by party size by 
dividing each legislator's centrality by the maximum centrality in that party (so after 
normalization, the maximum centrality within each party is exactly equal to one). There 
are seven parties in the EP, but also a number of legislators who are unaffiliated. These 
unaffiliated voters we normalize by treating the entire EP as their party for the purposes 
of normalization, thus dividing by the maximum centrality across the entire EP. This 
adjusted centrality for each legislator is a variable we call party centrality. 
Next, we calculate (and normalize using the same algorithm) centrality separately 
for votes within 21 substantive policy areas delineated by the jurisdictions of the EP’s 
standing committees), as summarized in Table 1. 
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
This allows us to evaluate legislator centrality within individual policy areas, and 
thus to tease out those legislators who have very high levels of influence in specific 
policy areas rather than simply general influence across the entire range of legislation. 
We define as policy leaders the top 5% most influential MEPs in each policy area, which 
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are assigned a value of one (otherwise zero), and then add up the instances when each 
MEP falls into this category. This creates a count measure (called policy leader) of policy 
influence across policy areas, ranging from 0 (leadership in zero policy areas) to 19 
(leadership in 19 areas of 21 areas). Table 2 lists the EP’s top policy leaders (those who 
are leaders in eight or more policy areas). 
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Next, we run a negative binomial regression analysis to determine what predicts 
this count variable. Table 3 presents the results and shows three predictors to be 
associated with policy leadership: serving as rapporteur (the number of reports drafted), 
the total number of intergroups joined (intergroups are voluntary organizations composed 
of MEPs who share a common interest in an issue or cause),4 and participation in roll-call 
votes. In other words, policy leaders are MEPs who draft legislation on behalf of the EP, 
participate in voluntary, issue-based legislative member organizations, and fulfill their 
most basic (and consequential) duty: voting on the EP floor. 
 




European Parliament Elections: What We Know 
Aside from measuring policy leadership, a second empirical objectives of this 
paper is to identify the predictors of reelection to the European Parliament, and to 
determine if policy leadership contributes to the likelihood that individual MEPs are 
reelected to the chamber. EP elections have received a substantial amount of attention in 
                                                            
4. Intergroups play an important role in the provision of policy-relevant information in the EP (Ringe and 
Victor 2013).  
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previous research, much of which revolves around the conceptualization of EP elections 
as “second order national elections” (e.g., Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif 1984, 1985; 
Koepke and Ringe 2006; Hix and Marsh 2007, 2011). EP elections are second-order 
because voters attach less salience to them than to “first-order” electoral contests 
(generally those that determine the composition of the national level executive in the 
member states) and tend to think of these elections as having lower stakes, which has 
important implications for their voting behavior.  
Specifically, voters behave differently in three main ways when casting their 
ballots in EP elections. First, they are less likely to turn out to vote in the first place. 
Second, they are more likely to vote sincerely (for their genuinely most preferred parties), 
rather than strategically (for less-preferred parties with a better chance of winning, for 
fear of “wasting their votes” on likely losers). Third, due to the perceived lack of direct 
policy consequences, citizens feel free to cast protest votes to express dissatisfaction with 
government party behavior in the first-order arena, (without, however, changing the 
composition of the first-order executive). These voting dynamics have important 
consequences for party performance in second-order elections: less strategic voting 
entails that large parties tend to do worse, sincere voting that small and more 
ideologically extreme parties perform well, and protest voting that parties that are part of 
the national executive lose. 
More recent research has moved past the traditional boundaries of the second-
order elections model and has focused on individual-level factors in EP vote choice. 
Much of this research focuses on how voters cast their ballots strategically to send signals 
to national-level parties (Hix and Marsh 2007; Hobolt et al 2009; Hobolt and Spoon 
16 
2012). While many have explored the nature of EP voting as a signaling mechanism 
between voters and national parties, some scholars have sought to identify more clearly 
which factors determine selection of specific parties. These studies have found, most 
importantly, that vote choice is informed by the structure of national institutions and 
voters’ attitudes toward national parties (van der Eijk et al 1996; Hix 2002), but also that 
voters will make decisions on the basis of pro-/anti-EU attitudes if they are given 
information specific to the EU context (Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). There is, in other 
words, an emerging European dimension that drives electoral considerations. 
 Other recent scholarship has tried to predict party change and success within the 
structure of second-order elections. Some branches of this research have pointed to a shift 
in the composition of party manifestos, insisting that, as the EU becomes more salient in 
the mind of voters, parties have adapted their manifestos to focus more on EU issues 
(Spoon 2012; Kovar 2013). Moreover, both party size and the timing of elections affect 
the nature of change in party manifestos (Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014). Party success, in 
other words, appears less tied to traditional, left-right ideological cleavages and more to 
the way in which parties navigate an evolving issue space (Proksch and Lo 2012; Rovny 
2012).  
 Existing research on EP elections does a great deal to explain the relationship 
between voters, institutions, and parties, but there is a gap in our understanding of the 
factors which contribute to individual MEPs’ prospects for reelection. Much of this 
research correctly notes the importance of the configuration of domestic institutions in 
determining incumbents’ chances reelection. Because there is variation in the nature of 
the renomination process, some incumbent MEPs will fail in their reelection bid simply 
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because they receive a poor placement on the party list while others will fail to secure 
renomination by a more local constituency (Faas 2003; Hix 2004). Given the variation of 
renomination constituencies, MEPs face varying incentives to demonstrate their political 
value to either voters or copartisans (Sigilas and Tiemann 2012). Similarly, MEPs are 
responsive to the career paths available to them and these contextual factors may shape 
their behavior while in office (Meserve et al 2009).  
 Though domestic institutions and renomination constituencies for incumbent 
MEPs are certainly important factors in the reelection process, they do little to explore 
the importance of incumbents’ behavior while in office. Unfortunately, current 
scholarship on MEP reelection provides few comprehensive analyses of the relationship 
between behavior and reelection. Of the research that is available, scholars identify 
certain activities such as legislative speeches and roll call voting as ways for incumbents 
to signal their value to partisan and domestic constituencies (Slapin and Proksch 2010; 
Sigilas 2011). At a broader level, scholars have argued that incumbent MEPs are also 
more likely to be reelected when they adopt the behavioral patterns of other incumbent 
MEPs (Lindstädt et al 2012). That is, because MEPs face competing demands from 
constituencies at multiple levels, those who quickly learn how to balance these demands 
will be rewarded with re-election. While such arguments do point to behaviors that may 
contribute to reelection, they do not get at the relationship in which we are interested: 






Beyond identifying policy leaders in EP politics, the main questions our research 
seeks to address are: what determines the likelihood that incumbent MEPs are reelected 
and, specifically, does policy leadership help explain reelection? We take as the starting 
point for considering these questions the theory of retrospective voting (esp. Fiorina 
1981), according to which an incumbent legislator’s likelihood of reelection is a function 
of voters’ evaluations of his or her term in office. In the context of the EP, this 
straightforward proposition is complicated, first, by the weakness of the “electoral 
connection” between voters and representatives: voters tend not to know much about the 
EP and its members, despite the legislature’s recent empowerment. Second, not all 
members of the EP are elected using the same electoral rules. Most importantly, even 
though all EU member states now use some form or proportional representation, almost 
half of all MEPs (371 of 751) are drawn from closed party lists (EPSR 2014), which do 
not give voters the opportunity to indicate a preference for individual candidates. For 
these reasons, we consider retrospective voting from the perspective of both parties and 
voters. Which attributes increase the likelihood that parties (when they draw up their 
electoral lists) and voters (when they cast a ballot) will reward incumbent MEPs with 
reelection?  
Two important caveats should be noted before we proceed. The first is that, 
because of limited data availability, we can only imperfectly measure incumbent MEPs’ 
ambition for reelection, in that we can only account for their “revealed ambition,” not 
their actual ambition. That is, we only know if an MEP sought reelection if s/he was 
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included on a national party’s electoral list, which means that we are necessarily 
excluding incumbents who sought reelection but were excluded from their parties’ lists.  
To determine the extent of possible selection bias, we consider how the MEPs 
included in our sample (i.e., MEPs who were included on national party electoral lists) 
differ systematically from MEPs not included (i.e., MEPs who either chose not to run 
again or who were not included on national party electoral lists), across our independent 
variables and a variety of additional attributes.5 We find that MEPs in our sample are, on 
average, about two years younger, have marginally less seniority (.18 terms), and are 
members of slightly larger parties (13 instead of 11.4 members). There is also a greater 
number of party group vice chairs in our sample (30) than in the group of MEPs not 
included (18). However, the main determinant of inclusion on national party lists, and 
thus our sample, seems to be legislative activity: the average MEPs in our sample 
participated in 3.29% more roll-call votes (84.55% vs. 81.26%), introduced 14 more 
motions for resolutions (38 vs. 24), made 42 more speeches (195 vs. 153), introduced 
slightly more written declarations (1.77 vs. 1.22), and amended ten more reports (71 vs. 
61). Overall, however, most differences between MEPs in our sample and those not in 
our sample are either not statistically significant (and therefore not reported here)6 or 
substantively slight. 
Second, we do not account for the ranking of MEPs on party lists, again due to a 
lack of information. In this sense, we fail to capture what is likely an important 
intervening variable, especially for those candidates on closed party lists. We are forced 
                                                            
5. See footnote 4 for a list of those attributes. 
6. It is particularly notable that MEPs who are more loyal to their national parties (that is, the “principals” 
who draw up electoral lists and therefore control the career paths of individual members) when casting 
votes on the EP floor are no more likely to secure spots on their parties’ electoral lists. 
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to skip this intermediate step and observe the final outcome: if an incumbent was 
reelected or not, operationalized as a dichotomous indicator where being reelected in the 
2014 EP election is coded 1 (otherwise 0). 
 Our principal hypothesis of interest revolves around policy leadership in the EP, 
and we expect that MEPs who were policy leaders during the preceding (2009-14) EP 
term are more likely to be reelected in 2014 than non-policy leaders (H1). The variable is 
operationalized as described above, but we do not, of course, expect policy leadership to 
be the only determinant of reelection. We also account for several other factors that are 
likely to matter. To start, we expect MEPs who have served as rapporteurs in 2009-14 to 
have a greater likelihood of being reelected (H2). Rapporteurs are MEPs who draft the 
EP’s official reports on specific policy proposals, have relevant policy expertise, 
shepherd the legislation through the lawmaking process, and serve as the EP’s main 
negotiator with other EU institutions. As such, they are valuable from the perspective of 
their national parties and EP party groups (who rely on their expertise and ability to bring 
legislation to a successful conclusion) and have greater visibility, from the voters’ 
perspective, than the average backbench MEPs. The rapporteur variable is 
operationalized as the number of reports drafted by each MEP. However, because many 
MEPs do not ever serve as rapporteurs, the variable would be highly skewed (zero-
inflated); we therefore use its log in our analyses. 
 We also expect MEPs in formal leadership positions in 2009-14 to have a greater 
likelihood of reelection (H3), all else equal. This is for several reasons, for example 
because formal leadership entails greater internal status (even in a legislature in which 
decision-making is decentralized); because leaders may yield some coercive capacity 
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(despite the reality that they cannot “whip” their rank-and-file in the EP as effectively as 
in many other legislative context); and because leaders are likely selected for leadership 
positions because they possess certain attributes that make them effective or influential in 
the first place. We include several dichotomous indicators to capture a premium paid on 
formal leadership: having served, during the previous EP term (2009-14), as chair or 
vice-chair of one of the EP political groups;7 as committee chair or vice-chair; as a 
member of the EP’s Bureau (which consists of EP President, Vice-Presidents, and 
Quaestors); as committee coordinator (a party groups’ spokespersons and main 
negotiators in each of the EP’s standing committees);8 or as the chair of one of the EP’s 
intergroups. 
 We also include a number of control variables. The first set of controls is internal 
to the EP and includes the number of previous terms served (as a measure of seniority, or 
experience); the proportion of votes cast that are identical with the national party line 
(which serves as an indicator for loyalty, since it is national parties that nominate 
candidates for election or reelection); as well as the total number of intergroup 
memberships and the proportion of all roll-call votes an MEP cast (to capture MEPs’ 
level of voluntary activity or dedication). Second, we account for the second-order 
election dynamics discussed previously. After all, it has important implications for the 
likelihood that individual MEPs secure reelection that small, ideologically more extreme, 
opposition parties tend to perform well while large, centrist, government parties tend to 
                                                            
7. Note that, unlike in the negative binomial regression presented in Table 3, we combine party chairs and 
party vice chairs into a single “party leader” category and committee chairs and vice-chairs into a single 
“committee leader” category, because party chair perfectly predicts reelection success and is thus dropped 
from the equation. The substantive results presented in Table 4 do not change, however, as a result of this 
change. 
8. Within “their” policy areas, coordinators are “the nexus mediating between individual MEPs, national 
party delegations that citizens voted for, and the European party group” (Kaeding and Obholzer 2012). 
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lose votes. We therefore include variables for national party size (operationalized as the 
party’s vote share in the last national election), national party ideology (position on the 
left-right dimension), and national party government status (a dichotomous indicator 
coded 1 if a party is part of the national executive) for each MEP. Finally, it stands to 
reason that the existence of preferential voting rules may systematically affect incumbent 
legislators’ likelihood of reelection. This is because such rules empower voters (who get 
to indicate their preferences for particular candidates) relative to parties (that draw up 
electoral lists). Accordingly, we control for ballot structure (measured dichotomously 
such that closed list is coded 1 and preferential voting 0). 
The results of the logistic regression analysis predicting 2009-14 incumbent 
reelection in the 2014 EP election, with standard errors clustered on country, are reported 
in Table 4.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
 
Most importantly, we find that being a policy leader is highly predictive of 
reelection: across the variable’s range (from its minimum to maximum values), the 
predicted probability of reelection increases by 36 percent, which confirms H1. We also 
find support for H2, as rapporteurships are associated with a greater likelihood of 
reelection: the difference in the probability of reelection increases by 47 percent across 
the variable’s range.9 Together, these results are not surprising, given the often highly 
technical legislation considered in the EP and the influential role policy experts play in 
EP decision-making (e.g. Bowler and Farrell 1995; Ringe 2010; Yoshinaka et al. 2010; 
Whitaker 2011; Daniel 2013). Politics in the EP are more bottom-up than in many 
                                                            
9. Note that this range is quite large, from 0 to 168. 
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national legislative contexts; it thus stands to reason that policy leaders and policy 
specialists (like rapporteurs) are the center of the law-making process.  
In contrast, support for H3, on the impact of formal leadership, is mixed. Serving 
as party leader in 2009-14 is a positive indicator of reelection, demonstrating that parties 
and voters reward those (high profile) MEPs with a proven record of formal leadership. 
Party leaders are 29% more likely to be reelected than rank-and-file MEPs. Also positive 
and significant, with an effect almost as sizable as that for party leaders, is intergroup 
leadership. MEPs who chair those voluntary groups are 27% more likely to secure 
reelection.  
Committee leaders and coordinators, in contrast, are not more likely to be 
reelected, which is somewhat surprising, but perhaps an indication that our policy 
leadership measure is picking up an important element of technocratic competence that is 
being rewarded by re-election, while not necessarily being reflected in the formal 
structure of the EP. Even more surprisingly, however, is that serving on the EP’s Bureau 
in 2009-14 is negatively associated with reelection (making reelection 27% less likely). 
The result has to be taken with a grain of salt, however, because of the small number of 
only 19 EP leaders, of which 11 were not reelected. In fact, if only two of those EP 
leaders had not lost their seats, this particular result would disappear.10 
 Of the control variables, only ballot structure impacts the likelihood of reelection: 
incumbent MEPs elected from closed lists are 21 percent more likely to be reelected, 
which suggests an anti-incumbent bias among voters against sitting MEPs in 2014—at 
                                                            
10. In light of the second-order election dynamics discussed above, it is notable that of those EP leader who 
were not reelected, 82% are from national government parties (compared to an average of 47% for all 
MEPs) that are substantially larger (with a vote share of 29.6% in the previous national election)  than the 
average (21.17%). This might help explain the poor electoral performance of these particular MEPs. 
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last among those who were able to indicate a preference for individual candidates 
because of preferential voting rules. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper sought to answer three research questions: who is influential in EP 
politics? Does policy leadership help explain reelection? And what factors other than 
policy leadership predict the likelihood that incumbent MEPs return for another term? 
In response to the first question, we developed a new measure of policy leadership 
in the EP that captures which lawmakers influence the greatest number of colleagues’ 
voting decisions within particular policy domains. Policy leaders, we found, are those 
MEPs who serve as rapporteurs; who participate in the EP’s intergroups; and who show 
up to vote on the EP floor. We then used this new measure to answer the second and third 
research question, by predicting the likelihood that incumbent MEPs secure reelection in 
the 2014 EP election, and found that policy leaders are more likely to be reelected, as are 
rapporteurs, party leaders, and intergroup chairs.  
Our paper contributes to the study of legislative politics by offering a new 
measure of influence that, notably, travels easily to other legislative arenas, as long as a 
sufficient number of roll-call votes are available. This is an important addition to the 
toolbox of legislative scholars, both of European politics and other legislative contexts, 
because it captures a notoriously diffuse concept while eschewing restrictive and highly 
contextual a priori assumptions about who should matter. It lets the data speak for itself. 
Finally, we contribute to the set of existing research on EP elections by identifying what 
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Table 1: Votes by policy area 
Policy Area # of Votes % of Votes 
Agriculture 452 6.5% 
Budget 675 9.7% 
Budgetary Control 438 6.3% 
Civil Liberties, Justice, & Home Affairs 436 6.3% 
Constitutional & Inter-institutional Affairs 262 3.8% 
Culture & Education 80 1.1% 
Development 107 1.5% 
Economic & Monetary Affairs 565 8.1% 
Employment & Social Affairs 436 6.3% 
Environment & Public Health 732 10.5% 
Fisheries 242 3.5% 
Foreign & Security Policy 754 10.8% 
Gender Equality 259 3.7% 
Industry, Research, & Energy 486 7.0% 
Internal Market Consumer Protection 141 2.0% 
Internal Regulations of EP 8 0.1% 
International Trade 397 5.7% 
Legal Affairs 216 3.1% 
Petitions 17 0.2% 
Regional Development 101 1.5% 
Transport & Tourism 157 2.3% 




Table 2: Top Policy Leader 
Last Name First Name Party Group Country 
Policy Leader (# 
of policy areas) 
MATULA Iosif PPE Romania 19 
PREDA Cristian Dan PPE Romania 19 
SALVINI Matteo EFD Italy 19 
LIOTARD Kartika Tamara GUE/NGL Netherlands 17 
BOZKURT Emine S&D Netherlands 16 
BREPOELS Frieda Verts/ALE Belgium 16 
HIBNER Jolanta Emilia PPE Poland 16 
LICHTENBERGER Eva Verts/ALE Austria 15 
SILVESTRIS 
Sergio Paolo 
Francesco PPE Italy 15 
SZYMANSKI Konrad ECR Poland 14 
DAUL Joseph PPE France 13 
DORFMANN Herbert PPE Italy 13 
KLASS Christa PPE Germany 13 
URUTCHEV Vladimir PPE Bulgaria 13 
BAUER Edit PPE Slovakia 12 
FERNANDES Jose Manuel PPE Portugal 12 
KOSTINGER Elisabeth PPE Austria 12 
PANAYOTOV Vladko Todorov ALDE Bulgaria 12 
SZAJER Jozsef PPE Hungary 12 
GRIESBECK Nathalie ALDE France 11 
GROSSETETE Francoise PPE France 11 
KUKAN Eduard PPE Slovakia 11 
MARINESCU Marian-Jean PPE Romania 11 
ANDRIKIENE Laima Liucija PPE Lithuania 10 
ANTONESCU Elena Oana PPE Romania 10 
MANN Thomas PPE Germany 10 
OLBRYCHT Jan PPE Poland 10 
PASCU Ioan Mircea S&D Romania 10 
STOLOJAN Theodor Dumitru PPE Romania 10 
ARIF Kader S&D France 9 
BACH Georges PPE 
Luxembour
g 9 
CUTAS George Sabin S&D Romania 9 
GAHLER Michael PPE Germany 8 
GOMES Ana S&D Portugal 8 
in 't VELD Sophia ALDE Netherlands 8 
KOCH Dieter-Lebrecht PPE Germany 8 




Table 3: Predicting Policy Leadership 
Variable C (SE) p>|z| 
Reports Drafted (log) .21 (.1) 0.05* 
Party Group Chair 1.03 (.66) 0.12 
Party Vice Chair -.09 (.34)  0.79 
Committee Chair -.68 (.49) 0.16 
Committee Vice Chair -.21 (.24) 0.38 
Coordinator -.28 (.26) 0.28 
Intergroup Chair .50 (.34) 0.14 
Terms Served .06 (.08) 0.4 
National Party Loyalty .03 (.04) 0.41 
Total # of Intergroups .11 (.04) 0.005** 
Roll Call Votes .08 (.01) <0.001*** 
Constant -10.34 (3.5) 0.003** 
Log Alpha 1.12 (0.10)  
Alpha 3.07 (0.31)  
p < 0.001***, p < 0.01**, p<0.05* 





Table 4: Logistic Regression Predicting Reelection 
 




Policy Leader H1 0.10 (0.04) 0.03** mean: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 
min: 0.51 (0.37,0.64) 




H2 0.46 (0.16) <0.01*** mean: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 
min: 0.42 (0.28,0.57) 




H3 1.42 (0.49) <0.01*** 0: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 
1: 0.83 (0.71, 0.95) 
+29% 
Committee Leader H3 -0.21 
(0.26) 
0.42   
EP Leader H3 -1.12 
(0.47) 
0.02** 0: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 
1: 0.27 (0.12, 0.43) 
-27% 
Coordinator H3 -0.17 
(0.35) 
0.63   
Intergroup Chair H3 1.29 (0.64) 0.04** 0: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 
1: 0.81 (0.60, 1.02) 
+27% 
Terms Served Control -0.10 
(0.09) 
0.29   
National Party 
Loyalty 
Control 0.01 (0.04) 0.87   




0.93   
Roll Call Votes Control 0.00 (0.01) 0.89   
Closed List Control 0.96 (0.29) <0.01*** 0: 0.54 (0.40,0.67) 









0.26   




0.75   
Constant  -0.56 
(4.29) 
0.895   
p < 0.01***, p < 0.05** 
Standard Errors Clustered by Country 
Number of obs=478; Wald chi2(15)= 257.26; Prob>chi2=0.0000;Log pseudolikelihood = -282.20228 
Pseudo R2=0.0980 
 
